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Abstract
 
After a triumphant entry to Kosovo as the liberators of the Albanians, the perception gradually
developed of a neo-colonial occupying force, directed by "the internationals", the western
bureaucrats charged with reconstituting Kosovo as a functioning democracy. In the face of
chronic unemployment and unleavened poverty, local views of the "internationals" have
grown profoundly negative. The marked differentials in salaries and living standards, allied to
widespread perceptions of corruption on the part of the new ruling elite, have rendered the
"internationals" a much less neutral (and thus less effective) player in the political process. 
The assassination of the prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, one year ago plunged Serbia into a
political crisis which reinforced Serb insecurity and weakened the hand of democratic forces.
The coming Serbian presidential election is likely to be won by the ultra- nationalist Radical
party which scored 28 per cent of the vote in the general election before Christmas and has
been making much political capital out of the impotence of the Serb government in the face
of the ethnic cleansing of their brethren in Kosovo. 
The difficulty lies in reconstituting Kosovo as a practical issue of politics in preference to an
emotional national attachment. Slavenka Drakulic, a liberal Croatian intellectual, has recently
published an extraordinary study of the detainees being held by the International War Crimes
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. There, at the Scheveningen detention unit in The Hague,
Serb, Croat and Muslim indictees mix freely, share a common language, work out at the gym
together and swap news and gossip from home. 
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Burning churches, braying mobs, senseless sectarian murder and an international presence
patently struggling to contain the carnage. In an environment where the cigarette-lighter has
become once again a weapon ofmass expulsion the Balkans has returned to international
attention. And for all the wrong reasons.
In a grotesque reverse image of1999, Serb communities have been subjected to a
systematic campaign ofethnic cleansing by Albanian provocateurs.
The upsurge in violence is rooted in the interaction ofthree separate but inter-related factors.
The first and most important is the tension arising out of Kosovo's unresolved and quite
ambiguous constitutional status. The second is the growing Albanian disenchantment with
the ruling UNMIK administration.
Finally, there is the poisonous legacy ofthe past and the role played by political elites on both
sides ofthe divide. Each ofthese factors has contributed to the escalation oftensions. The UN
Security Council Resolution 1244 ofJune 10th, 1999, effectively established Kosovoas a
temporary western protectorate under the authority ofUNMIK. The province was formally
recognised as part ofYugoslavia.
But it was clear from the outset that some sort ofindependent Albanian state would emerge in
a "final settlement". With the Albanian population constituting a nine-to-one majority in the
province, an overwhelming mandate for independence could be the only possible outcome in
a future referendum.
Yugoslavia has now disappeared and been replaced by an artificial entity called the State
Union ofSerbia and Montenegro which few observers expect to survive once independence
referendums are triggered in each jurisdiction. Thus the prospect ofa further break- up ofthe
successor state to Yugoslavia itself promotes the idea ofan ethnically demarcated and
independently constituted Kosovo.
Whilst UNMIK hopes centred on the provision ofa space where an inter-ethnic dialogue could
be fostered, in reality Albanians and Serbs are now further apart than ever.
The Panglossian policy choice ofUNMIK and the EU has been to encourage democratic
institution-building whilst continually refusing to address the issue offinal status talks.
Albanian frustration with this has grown steadily and now threatens to wreck the fragile post-
1999 political compact. In this political vacuum, dissatisfaction with the occupying forces has
grown.
After a triumphant entry to Kosovoas the liberators ofthe Albanians, the perception gradually
developed ofa neo-colonial occupying force, directed by "the internationals", the western
bureaucrats charged with reconstituting Kosovoas a functioning democracy. In the face of
chronic unemployment and unleavened poverty, local views ofthe "internationals" have
grown profoundly negative. The marked differentials in salaries and living standards, allied to
widespread perceptions ofcorruption on the part ofthe new ruling elite, have rendered the
"internationals" a much less neutral (and thus less effective) player in the political process.
The goal ofthe political process, as in other post-conflict polities such as Northern Ireland,
has centred on building trust between the communities.
This has not been made any easier by the increased marginalisation ofmoderates on both
the Albanian and Serb sides. It is extremists who now call the shots, sharingas they do a
common aim: to scupper negotiations between the Serb government in Belgrade and the
Albanian-dominated government in Pristina.
For some Albanians independence remains desirable only as a stepping-stone to the real
goal, the unification ofall lands populated by Albanians within a greater Albania. But even if
that goal is not widely shared, Albanian enthusiasm for power-sharinghas diminished
markedly.
In Kosovo's first free parliamentary elections in November 2001 all its Albanian parties
campaigned on an independence platform.
There is clear evidence that last week's violence against local Serb communities was
organised and systematic. Balkan specialists see it as a form ofpre-emptive action on the
part ofsome Albanian groups, that is, to ethnically cleanse as many areas as possible of
Serbs before moving to a final settlement which will limit the geographic concentration of
Serbs to a handful ofcantons in the north. It is a very Balkan logic predicated on an ingrained
belief that violence and action are demonstrably preferable to dialogue and compromise.
Last week's demonstrations in Belgrade point to the depth offeeling among Serbs on the
issue. Kosovois the spiritual essence of"celestial Serbia", the site ofits most important
Orthodox churches and the locus ofthe foundation myth ofthe modern Serb nation.
The assassination ofthe prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, one year ago plunged Serbia into a
political crisis which reinforced Serb insecurity and weakened the hand ofdemocratic forces.
The coming Serbian presidential election is likely to be won by the ultra- nationalist Radical
party which scored 28 per cent ofthe vote in the general election before Christmas and has
been making much political capital out ofthe impotence ofthe Serb government in the face of
the ethnic cleansing oftheir brethren in Kosovo.
It is extraordinarily dispiriting to encounter (as I did on a recent visit to once-cosmopolitan
Belgrade) even liberal young Serbs who still hold to ideas about "eternal Kosovo" and its
central place in their cognitively constituted Serbia.
Albanians are routinely depicted as terrorist Untermenschen and criminal reprobates,
unworthy ofa state oftheir own. Ultimately Serbia will have to face the fact that some form of
divorce is necessary.
The difficulty lies in reconstituting Kosovoas a practical issue ofpolitics in preference to an
emotional national attachment. Slavenka Drakulic, a liberal Croatian intellectual, has recently
published an extraordinary study ofthe detainees being held by the International War Crimes
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. There, at the Scheveningen detention unit in The Hague,
Serb, Croat and Muslim indictees mix freely, share a common language, workout at the gym
together and swap news and gossip from home.
Drakulic, in an ironic reference to Tito-era Yugoslavia, describes the atmosphere as one of
"brotherhood and unity", where ethnic differences are put aside.
Dr John O'Brennan is a lecturer in European politics at the Department ofPolitics and Public
Administration in the University ofLimerick
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